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The Lot Is Cast into the Lap: Federal
Communications Commission Mistreatment
of State Lottery Broadcasts
INTRODUCTION

The State of New Hampshire is the only one of the 50 states which
can make the claim that it manages to maintain itself without the financial help of either a sales tax or a broad-based personal income tax.
One possible reason for the prolonged economic survival of this minority of one is that New Hampshire, 10 years ago, had the wisdom
to implement the first modem state-run lottery.' Presently, 13 states2
are attempting to raise revenue without increasing their taxes by utilizing this form of gambling.
These state lotteries have had a modicum of success in accruing
capital which can be used for churches, schools, hospitals, or placed
in a general fund.3 However, the lottery states feel that anachronistic federal lottery laws 4 have, from the inception of the state games
until the recent modification of the laws, needlessly inhibited their
efforts to collect even more revenue for the public good 5 by forcing
1. 120 CONG. Rnc. E3016 (daily ed. May 15, 1974) (remarks of Congressman
Roncallo).
2. The 13 states are New Hampshire, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
3. The states listed below have received $601.5 million from their lotteries; this
amount was collected and used by these states as follows: New York, $243 million for
education since 1967; New Jersey, $200 million for education from 1971 to 1973; Pennsylvania, $80 million for property tax assistance for the elderly from 1972 to 1973;
Massachusetts, $36 million for municipalities from 1972 to 1973; Connecticut, $25 million for a general fund from 1972 to 1973; Michigan, $14 million for a general fund
in six months; Maryland, $3.5 million for a general fund in two months. 120 CONG.
REC. E3016-17, supra note 1.
4. Some cases strongly suggest that broadcasters are subject to both federal and
state regulation in this area. Volner, The Games Consumers Play, 25 FED. COM. B. J.
121 (1973); see, e.g., Midwest Television Inc. v. Waaler, 44 Ill. App. 2d 401, 194 N.E.
2d 653 (1963).
5. Ralph F. Batch, superintendent of the Illinois state lottery, told the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee in November that the federal ban on the use of the
mails had cost the state $97,000 per delivery of promotional materials, and the prohibition on broadcasting contributed to the 2500 prizes a week which went unclaimed. In
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the states to resort to complicated measures to make lottery information public.6
On September 6, 1974, apparently in response to the supplications
of some non-lottery states which resent the siphoning of their citizens'
dollars to neighboring states which have lotteries, Attorney General
William Saxbe invoked the spectre of federal prosecution for violations
by the states of federal lottery laws.' The immediate reaction to this
statement in Congress was a proliferation of voices in support of bills
to exempt state lotteries from federal law. Finally, on December 20,
only hours before the sounding of the final gavel of the 93d Congress,
the entreaties of the lottery states were answered by the passage of
18 U.S.C. § 1307, which lifted the restrictions on lottery-related publicity and the mailing of lottery tickets within a state.8
Prior to this legislative liberation of state lotteries, however, one
lottery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1304,1 which prohibits the broadcasting of any advertisement or information concerning a lottery, had become the source of a controversy which proceeded to the brink of a
Supreme Court decision. 10 The Federal Communications Commission and two circuit courts of appeal had occasion to construe and
apply section 1304 to the broadcast of information concerning the
state lotteries of New York and New Jersey. If the various constructions of this statute provide an interesting illustration of administrative inconsistency, the propriety and constitutionality of these consum, Batch estimated, the federal laws reduced Illinois lottery profits by $10.4 million
per year. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 20, 1974, at 52, col. 1.
6. The State of Michigan, for example, unable to advertise for its lottery on local
broadcast outlets, was forced to publicize its lottery on Canadian stations accessible to
Michigan listeners. 119 CoNG. REc. E2750 (daily ed. May 1, 1973) (remarks of Congressman Harrington).
7. New York Times, Sept. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1307 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304 shall not apply
to an advertisement, list of prizes, or information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under authority of State law(2) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that
State or an adjacent State which conducts such a lottery.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 provides:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station,
knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn
or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether
said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Each day's broadcasting shall constitute a separate offense.
10. New Jersey State Lottery Commission v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir.
1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 941 (1975).

See note 92 infra.
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structions furnish an equally engaging example of diverse judicial and
and federal agency attitudes toward broadcast freedom. The appropriate starting point is not the present, but the past.
EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN LOTTERIES,

AND THE LINEAGE OF 18 U.S.C. § 1304
Lotteries are as endemically Anglo-American as the common law.
Both phenomena journeyed westward over the Atlantic at least as
early as the Mayflower, and both claimed as their raison d'etre the
commonweal of colonial America. A total of 158 lotteries were
licensed in the colonies, 132 of which fed civic coffers rather than
private pockets. The list of community lottery managers includes such
early American luminaries as Benjamin Franklin, John Hancock, and
George Washington; and even the Revolution was financed in part
through a lottery established by the Continental Congress."
Having thus aided the cause of independence, lotteries continued
to gain public acceptance and to prosper under the management of privately licensed contractors after the war, and some states even acted
as contractors for a time.' 2 Eventually, however, lotteries became big
business, and abuse and embezzlement ensued, causing a major shift
in public opinion. 1"
Reacting to their constituencies, state legislators began to take prohibitive action against lotteries, and had very nearly obliterated them
when the outbreak of the Civil War and the resulting postwar
poverty in the South caused a lottery renaissance. Paradoxically,
however, in this, its finest hour, the great American tradition of lotteries was hoist by its own petard; its revitalization brought it to the
attention of the federal government, and ultimately proved to be its undoing.14
By the late 19th century only the infamous Louisiana Lottery, national in its scope, survived as a remnant of the halcyon days when
local lotteries flourished in almost every community. To destroy the
the Louisiana Lottery, Congress took multiple action against its very
foundations: publicity and interstate transportation.
11.

J.

EZELL,

FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL 272 (1960).

12. Id. at 101. State managed lotteries in Maryland and Georgia were, in fact, early
harbingers of modern bond issue financing; the proceeds of the Maryland lottery going
to a fund for the construction of a monument to George Washington, and the Georgia

lottery contributing to monuments for General Nathanael Greene and Casimir Pulaski.
Id. at 119.
13. Id. at 273.
14. Id. at 230.
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Congress had prohibited the mailing of information concerning illegal lotteries in 1872.11 Four years later, the word "illegal" was
dropped from the statute, 6 and subsequent amendments specifically
stated that newspapers were subject to the ban."7 Ultimately, Congress closed all the channels of interstate commerce, effectively pre-

venting the circulation and importation of lottery paraphernalia,

8

and completed the demise of the Louisiana Lottery.

It was this series of legislation, in response to an immediate problem, which eventually became 18 U.S.C. § 1302,1 the postal statute
whose language was used as the foundation of section 1304. For
the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent of this forerunner of
section 1304, the debates on the second of the four above mentioned
acts, the amendment which dropped the word "illegal" from the statute, are particularly enlightening and illustrate how the original purpose of the lottery laws is inextricably bound with the milieu in which
they were born.
The proposal to delete the word "illegal" from the mail statute
was hotly contested in the Senate. The first to rise to question the wisdom of federal restrictions on legal state lotteries was Senator William
Whyte, of Maryland, who introduced an amendment to strike this part
of the bill and leave this language unchanged. Mr. Whyte noted:
I feel that this bill is going to do injustice in certains [sic] quarters
of this country ....
[The bill] strikes out the word "illegal," . . . . Certainly
,the Senate does not mean to decide that the citizens of a State
15. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 302. See Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1878) for the constitutional basis of Congress's power to legislate in this area.
16. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90. See Commerford v. Thompson,
1 F. 417 (C.C.D. Ky. 1880), upholding the statute.
17. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465.
18. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 28 Stat. 963. See Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321 (1903) for a discussion of the constitutionality of this provision.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1302 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Whoever knowingly deposits in the mail, or sends or delivers by mail:
Any letter, package, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon
lot or chance;
Any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind containing
any advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of any kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or containing any
list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes;
Shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both; and for any subsequent offense shall be imprisoned not more than five
years.
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where lotteries are legal have no right to send 'a20 lottery scheme or
circular from one portion of the State to another.
These remarks earned Mr. Whyte a quick reply-"That is precisely
what we mean." 2 1-from the bill's sponsor, Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine; and the following lecture on congressional power vis-a-vis
lotteries from Senator John Logan of Illinois:
If Congress has a right to prohibit obscene matter passing through
the mails, it has the right to prohibit lottery tickets or advertisements for lotteries, or any other thing, on the same principle ...
Lotteries. . . when legalized are legalized gambling, and they can
only be legalized in States that are in favor of gambling; and whereever a community is so demoralized that they are in favor of gambling they will then legalize lotteries, and not ,till they are so ....
• . . Many people in my part of the country have been made
the victims of these gambling frauds. They are nothing more than
gambling hells. I would just as lief legalize and license to-day a
house in Washington for dealing faro as to legalize a lottery.
They are on the same principle, except that I think to deal in faro
is a little fairer, because a man can stand by 2and
see when they
2
steal from him and in the lottery case he cannot.
These statements provide a useful incite into the prevailing attitude
of the time and into the reasons why Congress was so eager to prohibit the mailing of information on legal as well as illegal lotteries.23
Mr. Whyte's amendment was soundly defeated.
Whether the sentiments of these 19th century legislators were
echoed in the days preceding passage of the broadcast statute will be
20.
21.
22.

23.

4 CoNG. REc. 4262 (1876).
Id.
Id.

Perhaps the simmering passions, if not the total abdication of reason, aroused

by congressional discussion of legal and illegal lotteries is better demonstrated by the
following angry exchange:
Mr. Whyte: I am delighted that our friends on the other side, the Sena-

tor from Illinois and other gentlemen, have suddenly become moralized, if I
may be permitted to use that expression. They were not so very moral when
they could make money out of lotteries during the war. The Internal Revenue
Dept. taxed lottery tickets.

Mr. Logan: What does the Senator mean when he says, speaking of certain Senators, that they were not so very moral when they could make money
out of lotteries during the war? Does he refer to us as having anything to
do with lotteries?

Mr. Whyte: The Senator must not misunderstand me.

I say that to-day

it is immoral to allow lottery tickets to go through the mail, while during the

war or toward the close of the war it was perfectly moral to tax lottery tickets
and to make money out of the sale of lottery tickets! That is all I mean to
say.

Mr. Logan:

That depends on the men who were in Congress at that

time; a different class perhaps.
This colloquy is followed by an even further degeneration of the level of debate,
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considered elsewhere in this article.24 First, however, it is fitting to
examine the genealogy of section 1304 itself, and the recent alteration of the lottery laws.
The Radio Act of 1927 was the first congressional attempt to prevent the impending din which the unchecked proliferation of airwave
voices threatened to become. The Act did not contain a section pertaining to lotteries. Of particular importance to this article, however, was the initial appearance of a provision later to become 47
U.S.C. § 326, the present anti-censorship provision of the Communications Act.2 5 The passage of this section and of the entire system of
broadcast regulation gained impetus from four National Radio Conferences held from 1922 to 1925 which were attended by the principle
sponsors of the 1927 legislation. At the last of these conferences
unanimous approval was given to a resolution which stated that any
form of censorship other than public opinion was unnecessary and to
be assiduously avoided.28
In the later debates in Congress, the sponsors of the Radio Act referred to the recommendations of these conferences and made it clear
that no power of program censorship was to be given to a government
agency.2 7
From this setting of solicitude toward broadcast freedom, the antecedent of 18 U.S.C. § 1304 first emerged. It was debated and
passed as part of House Bill 7716 in 1932, which was pocket-vetoed
by President Hoover. It was incorporated 2 years later, without debate, into the bill which eventually became the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which amended and supplemented the 1927 Radio
Act. Therefore, it is the 1932 debates which provide the only indication of congressional intent which can aid an assessment of the constructions placed upon section 1304 by the F.C.C., lottery proponents,
and the courts four decades later.
finally reaching its nadir in a discussion of whether a bottle of whiskey would also be
banned from the mail as immoral, and whether it would be wiser to send whiskey in

a tin can to prevent breakage. On this point Mr. Whyte expressed the belief that "It
drinks just as well out of a tin can. . . as out of a glass bottle." Id. at 4263.
24. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
25.

47 U.S.C. § 326 reads:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of

free speech by means of radio communication.
26.

Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting, 177 ANNALS

185 (1935).
See 67 CoNG. REC. 5480, 12615 (1927).

ACADEMY OF POL. & SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

27.
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The House version of the lottery bill prohibited the broadcasting of
lottery information; the Senate version prohibited advertising. The
conferees of the two houses met to discuss changes in various provisions of the bill and emerged with the perfect compromise for the
lottery statute: a section forbidding the broadcasting of both information and advertising.2 8 The F.C.C. seems to feel that the fact
that this twofold ban issued from the deliberations of the conferees
signifies clear congressional intent that the proscription against lottery broadcasts go beyond mere promotional activity and extend instead to what could surely be termed censorship of program content,
an intent of questionable first amendment validity.29
The clarity with which the F.C.C. discerns this intent is somewhat
surprising in light of the continued vitality of 47 U.S.C. § 326, the
anti-censorship provision mentioned above, and statements in the
1932 debates such as the following from a member of the conference
committee, Congressman Frederick Lehlbach:
There is no change in the substantive provisions of the radio law
except the new paragraph which prohibits the broadcasting or
advertising of lotteries, . . . and it is not in the sense of censorship that this provision is sought .... 30
and from the bill's sponsor in the House, Congressman Ewin Davis:
I must conclude my remarks with an explanation of the only
thing that is new, and that is section 13, which forbids, in effect, conductinglotteries over radio stationsA
It seems, therefore, that the question of how far Congress had intended its ban on lottery broadcasting to extend in terms of program
content was not clearly answered when section 1304 was passed.
There appears to be little doubt about what a court must do when
faced with congressional confusion of this sort in a first amendment
area. Before a court sustains a restriction upon free expression, it
must be certain that the legislature has recognized that the restriction
creates a conflict between freedom of expression and the need for regulation, and that the legislature has made a deliberate decision in favor
of the latter.8 2 Since it is apparent from the debates that such a decision was not made, the F.C.C.'s interpretation of section 1304, border28.
29.
United
30.
31.
32.

See 76 CONG. Rnc. 5204 (1932).
Brief for Respondent F.C.C. at 12, New Jersey State Lottery Commission v.
States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974).
75 CONG. REC. 3684 (1932) (emphasis added).
Id. at 3683 (emphasis added).
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959).
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ing on censorship of program content, should not be sustained by a
court.
Another unresolved question is whether the legislators of 1932, unlike
their 1974 counterparts, intended such restrictions on the use of the
media to apply to state lotteries. In the debates on the recent passage of
18 U.S.C. § 1307, the lottery laws were treated generically. Much emphasis was placed upon the fact that they were originally enacted to
deal with the evils of the Louisiana Lottery and its contemporaries, and
thus could not have been meant to apply to legal lotteries. 3 3 As has
already been demonstrated, however, the early mail statutes were intended to apply to all lotteries in an effort to protect the gullible citizenry from colonial con men.3 4 Wholly apart from this attitude of the
19th century Congress, however, are the problems of whether 18
U.S.C. § 1304, the product of a different milieu, should not really be
treated separately from the earlier statutes prohibiting the mailing of
lottery information, and, therefore, whether the possible different motives for the passage of section 1304 should be examined. Although
the earlier statutes were passed with an eye toward any lottery scheme,
section 1304 was seemingly passed to deal with problems like the
following:
[F]rauds and deadbeats, who call themselves wizards, soothsayers,
mind readers, and miracle performers, . . . talk over many of
the various radios in various parts of the country 15 minutes or 30
minutes a day, read characters, discuss certain human characteristics, and then notify the gullible people to come to the offices
into paying
of these wizards, where the people are hoodwinked
35
from $1 to $5 for readings, talks, and the like.

Therefore, as can be seen, legal state lotteries were not intended by
the legislators to be within the ambit of section 1304.
Actually, it makes little difference, whether the passage of section
1307 rested upon an erroneous reading of the original intent of the
mail statutes or upon the belief that the only bans presently necessary
on lottery broadcasting are more closely akin to the needs of the 1930's
Congress to combat "frauds and deadbeats." The result for pro-lottery
forces is identical: an ultimate decision that state-sanctioned lotteries
should be exempt from federal law.
F.C.C. POLICY: LOTTERIES VIS-.-VIS HORSERACING

An interesting counterpoint to the apparent relish with which the
33.
34.

See 120 CONG. REc. H12599-609 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974).
See text accompanying notes 21 and 22 supra.

35.

75 CONG. REc. 3693 (1932).
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F.C.C. has applied 18 U.S.C. § 1304 to state lotteries has been the
Commission's approach to the broadcasting of horseracing information. In a 1964 policy statement on the subject, the F.C.C. stated:
[We] wish to stress that it [is] not 'the Commission's intention
to inhibit the broadcasting of appropriate news, publicity, and
advertising concerning horseracing. Horseracing and parimutuel
betting at racetracks are, of course, permitted in many States.
Indeed, the revenues derived . . . are of considerable significance to many of the States . . . . Rather, as stated, the proposed rules [are] intended to specify those broadcast practices
which [are] most likely to aid illegal gambling
and which do not
36
appear to serve a legitimate public need.
The formula, then, for determining whether a horseracing broadcast is impermissible is twofold. The nature of the broadcast must be
7
such that it would benefit those whose gambling activities are illegal,
and the broadcast must not be one which serves a legitimate public
need. The stress laid upon the second half of the formula is illustrated in a 1973 F.C.C. ruling on the subject of promotional broadcasts for the New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation."
In
view of the avowed dual purpose of Off-Track Betting-raising revenue
and crippling illegal gambling-the Commission decided that the
Corporation's promotional campaign was permissible because it
served legitimate public needs.
Moreover, in ,the area of horseracing broadcasts, the F.C.C. deems
itself incapable of formulating rules which delineate what practices
are clearly improper but which, at the same time, do not interfere
with broadcasts of horseracing information which serve public needs.3 9
Instead, the Commission places the initial burden of deciding the propriety of the broadcast upon the individual licensees, who have the responsibility "to serve the public interest, and to avoid giving assist' 40
ance to illegal gambling interests.
In dealing with state lotteries, however, F.C.C. policy has been to
disregard the possibility of service to a legitimate public interest, and
to focus instead upon the promotional aspect of a lottery broadcast,
a one-step test, unlike the dual criteria applied to horseracing. 41 Fur36. 36 F.C.C. 1571, 1573 (1964).
37. An example of one way in which a broadcast can aid illegal gambling and thus
run afoul of the first part of the formula is found in 32 F.C.C.2d 705 (1971): promotional advertisements for legal off-track betting would be of benefit to illegal gambling
activities in that they encourage people to engage in equine wagering.
38. 41 F.C.C.2d 172 (1973).
39. 36 F.C.C. 1571, 1574 (1964).
40. Id. at 1575.
41. See 36 F.C.C. 93 (1964).
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thermore, the Commission has been disinclined to defer to the editorial
judgment of licensees in deciding the scope of permissible lottery
broadcasts.
Apparently, the rationale for this divergent treatment rests upon the
difference between the derivation of the F.C.C.'s authority to control
lottery broadcasts and the source of its jurisdiction in the area of
horseracing information.4 2 The power of the F.C.C. to regulate
horseracing broadcasts and other such gambling information derives
from its statutory duty to regulate licensees in the public interest.4"
Authority to oversee broadcasts of lottery information, however, is
founded not upon an amorphous public interest mandate, but rather
upon the supposed congressional policy embodied in section 1304.11
Consequently, the reason why the Commission has taken a somewhat
more liberal approach toward what will be permissible with regard
to horseracing than it has in the area of state lotteries seems to be
that it views the more flexible public interest criterion as providing it
with a greater degree of freedom to engage in a process of balancing the competing factors of aid to gambling and service to a legitimate public need.
In contrast to the public interest criterion, the specific statutory mandate of section 1304 forecloses any such balancing by the F.C.C. because, theoretically, the legislature has previously determined that a
lottery never serves a public need sufficient to outweigh its pernicious
effects.4 5 As this article has demonstrated, it is questionable whether
Congress has ever actually made this determination with respect to
state lotteries. Nonetheless, the F.C.C.'s appraisal of its limited authority to assess a lottery's benefit to the public is probably
correct in light of the more specific mandate of section 1304.
42.

The F.C.C. seems to hint as much at 41 F.C.C.2d 172, 174 n.8 (1973).

43.

47 U.S.C. § 307.

See also S.

REP.

No. 588, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)

and

H.R. REP. No. 967, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), where it is clearly stated that the
F.C.C. has sufficient power to deal with broadcasts of gambling information without the
mandate of a statute specifically addressed to the subject.
44. See New York State Broadcasters Association, Inc. v. United States, 414 F.2d

990, 995 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970).
45.

For those who question the idea that a lottery can ever be so noxious as to be

the subject of such reproach, consider the following from Adam Smith:
The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a perfectly fair lottery; or one
in which the whole gain compensated the whole loss; because the undertaker
could make nothing by it. .

.

. There is not, however, a more certain proposi-

tion in mathematics, than that the more tickets you adventure upon, the more
likely you are to be a loser. Adventure upon all the tickets in the lottery, and
you lose for certain.

I A. SMITH,

AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE A"

110-11 (6th ed. 1908).
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This conclusion alone, -however, does not end the consideration
of F.C.C. policy on horseracing broadcasts. Indeed, aside from the
Commission's view of its various statutory mandates,4" its divergent
approach towards horseracing and state lotteries has significance on a
wholly different level, that of the first amendment. As aforementioned,
while recognizing the potential danger of abetting illegal gambling,
the F.C.C. still evidences an intent to respect the protected nature of
"appropriate news."4
It appears, therefore, that even though the
Commission may feel there is a public need to discourage gambling,
that need does not, in the area of horseracing, outweigh the first amendment interests of broadcasters and listeners.4 8 Consequently, even some
horseracing broadcasts which may aid illegal gambling are permitted because they are deemed by the Commission to be appropriate news, and
therefore within the ambit of the first amendment's protection.
In dealing with state lotteries, however, even news broadcasts, normally entitled to first amendment protection, are, in the Commission's
view, considered capable of regulation because the amendment is
not so absolute a safeguard that it protects all categories of communication.49 It seems unlikely that the more hospitable first amendment
treatment accorded to horseracing broadcasts can be explained in
terms of a lower degree of countervailing policy interests. As stated by
the New Jersey State Lottery Commission:
If the concern over the promotion of illegal gambling does
not outweigh the legitimate public interests served by off-track betting, this conclusion should be even more evident with respect to
a legal state lottery. It is common knowledge that horse racing
is the subject of illegal gambling operations, and that off-track
betting information may potentially aid illegal gambling operations. There are no indications, however, that the results of legal
state lotteries are being used for comparable purposes. Thus, the
only adverse consideration which the F.C.C. has deemed significant in connection with the broadcasting of horserace results is absent here. Therefore, whatever arguments might be advanced
. . .that prevention of gambling outweighs the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment, it is manifest from the F.C.C.'s
own enforcement policies that the public interest in keeping com46. The mandates referred to here are those of 47 U.S.C. § 307 (see text accompanying note 18 supra) and 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6). The duty to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 1304
is delegated to the F.C.C. by 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6), and, of course, the Justice Department has concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the statute as a penal provision.
47. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
48. Brief for Respondent Lottery Commission at 24, United States v. New Jersey
State Lottery Commission, 95 S.Ct. 941 (1975).
49. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 12-13; Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 11, United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Commission, 95 S. Ct. 941 (1975).
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munications concerning legal state gambling away from the Ameri50
can public is simply non-existent.

If, therefore, there is an interest in closing the airwaves to any information which may aid illegal gambling, it seems that there is a
greater probability that this interest may be transgressed by horseracing broadcasts than by lottery news.
More recent interpretations and applications of section 1304 must
now be examined.
CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY

Whether section 1304 is construed to reach program content or
merely promotions is also significant in the first amendment context.
The interference by the government with program content raises the
issue of prior restraint.
The constitutionality of section 1304 was upheld, but the F.C.C.
construction of it invalidated, in American Broadcasting Co. v. United
States. 1 There, the court determined that the Commission's rules, by
purporting to label television give-away programs as lotteries, transcended the permissible scope of section 1304. Thus, these rules were
"considered as a form of 'censorship' . . . in violation of the First
Amendment."52 It was made clear, however, that section 1304 does
not penetrate the media's first amendment shield so long as it is applied "for the protection of the general public." 53 On appeal, the Supreme Court in American BroadcastingCo. stated:
If we should give § 1304 the broad construction urged by the
Commission, the same construction would likewise apply in criminal cases. . . . [The proposed construction] would do violence to
the well-established principle that penal statutes are to be con54
strued strictly.
What emerges from American Broadcasting Co., then, is a dual reason for construing section 1304 as narrowly as possible. A narrow
construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1304 is mandated both by its potential
for application to constitutionally protected speech, and by the custom
established for construction of criminal statutes. From this early
50. Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 25-26. But see 120 CONG. REc. E4508
(daily ed. July 3, 1974) for the proposition that results of state lotteries are being used
in illegal policy games.
51. 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd on other grounds sub nim. Federal
Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
52. 110 F. Supp. at 389.
53. Id.

54.
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treatment of the statute, therefore, it seems apparent that section 1304
is a law whose validity depends upon a strict interpretation of what
it dictates.
To answer the question of whether the wisdom of American Broadcasting Co. has been faithfully followed, it is necessary to analyze
the most recent cases involving section 1304 with an eye to whether
the F.C.C. has been consistent in strictly construing the statute, and
whether the Commission and the courts have given the same regard to keeping the camel's nose out of the tent of a free press" as
the American BroadcastingCo. Court.
The F.C.C.and the Second Circuit
The State of New York, in an effort to increase the somewhat
disappointing volume of lottery ticket sales, sought to publicize the state
lottery on radio and television. The members of the New York State
Broadcasters Association were eager to broadcast lottery news.
Aware, however, of the existence of section 1304 and fearful of license revocation, the Association petitioned the F.C.C. for a declaratory
ruling that the sanctions of the statute were not applicable to the
broadcasts they wished to make. Although the Commission declined
to answer specific questions concerning the kinds of broadcasts which
would be prohibited, it did for the first time construe the phrase "any
advertisement or information concerning." The F.C.C. announced
that any promotion or encouragement of a lottery over the air
was proscribed.5 6 News reports were exempted, apparently in deference to the first amendment, but the Commission's definition of
news was limited. A news report was considered anything broadcast
in normal good faith coverage and reasonably related to the public's
right to know about community events. 5 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals simultaneously narrowed and broadened this construction of section 1304. The court
limited the interpretation of "information concerning" to information
that directly promotes a lottery, and defined direct promotion as the
broadcast of information which has "essentially the same effect as
conducting it" on the air.5" The problem with the court's seemingly
55. This eloquent bit of phraseology is borrowed from Justice Stewart's dissent in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 402
(1973).
56. 14 F.C.C.2d 707, 710 (1968).
57. Id.
58. New York State Broadcasters Association v. United States, 414 F.2d 990, 997
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very narrow construction of the statute is that even good faith news
coverage, previously exempted by the F.C.C., could be banned if it
directly promotes a lottery. The court, apparently recognizing the
first amendment implications inherent in this reading of section 1304,
attempted to explain its departure from the constitutional and criminal law rules which dictate strict construction of statutes. The court
reasoned that the non-absolute protection of the first amendment permits an "official" government view on communications which promote
undesirable ends like swindling schemes and the sale of narcotics.
Accordingly, since Congress has adopted a view with respect to lottery
information, an interpretation of section 1304 which limits restraint
of lottery news broadcasts to those which are directly promotional is
constitutional. 5
It seems questionable whether this construction is indeed as strict
as that intended by the Supreme Court in American Broadcasting
Co.6" The answer to this question, however, becomes insignificant
at this point because the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
Commission, and, although relying upon the "direct promotion" test
in its later argument before another circuit court,6 the F.C.C. applied
the "direct promotion" test on remand in a way so convoluted as to
make it unrecognizable.
Gladly accepting the hint of the Second Circuit to apply its expertise in this area, the F.C.C., in a supplemental ruling, 62 applied the
directness test as follows: legitimate news appropriate to broadcasting
is permissible; news not within the scope of "ordinary broadcast journalism," however, is seemingly equated with direct promotional material and therefore prohibited. 63 Specifically, the F.C.C. prohibited information concerning where, how, and when the winning number is to
be drawn, the amounts of the prizes, and lists of the winners. A
steadfast adherence to the Second Circuit's opinion, of course, would
make the legitimacy or ordinariness of the news irrelevant, since the
crux of the test is not the news value of an item, but rather the directness of its promotional effect. It seems, therefore, that at this
point the F.C.C. had altered the court's direct promotion test, itself
(2d Cir. 1969). For authority that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 was indeed aimed primarily at
the evil of conducting a lottery on the air, see the remarks of Mr. Davis in the text
accompanying note 31 supra.
59. Id. at 996-99.
60. See text accompanying notes 52 through 54 supra.
61. See note 66 infra.
62. 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970).
63. Id. at 848.
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arguably something more than a narrow construction, into a brand
new "-bona fide-ness of news" test which cannot reasonably be
gleaned from even a liberal construction of section 1304.64
The F.C.C. and the Third Circuit
The Commission's obfuscation of the test to be applied and its inconsistency in construing section 1304 did not, however, end with its
consideration of the New York lottery. When first called upon to rule
on the permissibility of proposed New Jersey broadcasts (notably the
announcement of the winning number on a news program, totally
unadorned with any other lottery information), the F.C.C. responded negatively by reading the Second Circuit's opinion to distinguish between news and direct promotion, the latter being identified
with information of interest to only a limited audience and hence not
bona fide news. 65 At this point, then, it could not have been clear to
potential broadcasters of lottery information whether something which
was clearly bona fide news and yet also a direct promotion would
have been permissible as news, prohibited as a direct promotion, or
classified as non-news due to its promotional nature.
In its treatment of the New Jersey State Lottery Commission's Petition for Reconsideration, the F.C.C. finally embraced the directness
test as the proper interpretation of section 1304, three years after its
initial formulation by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 66 This
change by the Commission seems, however, to have been motivated
less by a desire to be faithful to judicial construction of the statute
than by the necessity to meet the reasoning of the lottery proponents.
Faced with the argument that announcing the winning number is indeed "ordinary broadcast journalism," and a bona fide news story of
widespread interest, the F.C.C. stated unequivocally that newsworthiness is not the proper test. The Commission concluded, rather, that
directness is the touchstone and stated:
The public demand may be "truly staggering" but it cannot change
64. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the New Jersey State Lottery Commission similarly noted the F.C.C.'s confusing application of 18 U.S.C. § 1304:
It is impossible to resist the conclusion, . . . that the agency has not given Section 1304 even the literal interpretation espoused in its own brief. Rather, in
the guise of interpretation, it has simply adopted its own version of a lottery
prohibition.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 48, at 16.
65. 30 F.C.C.2d 794, 795 (1971).
66. 36 F.C.C.2d 93 (1972).
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the law67to permit the broadcast of information directly promoting a
lottery.
The Commission's New Jersey decision was reviewed by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in New Jersey State Lottery Commission v.
United States.6
The court applied the free speech mandate of 47
U.S.C. § 32669 to lotteries, which had not even been discussed by
either the F.C.C. or the Second Circuit. The court concluded:
[T]he F.C.C. misconstrued the congressional mandate in the
Communications Act of 1934. Nothing in that statute was intended
to permit the exercise by the F.C.C. of control over editorial decisions of broadcast journalists. On the contrary as 47 U.S.C.
§ 326 makes clear, Congress expected
the F.C.C.'s actions to be
70
consistent with the first amendment.
The court in New Jersey State Lottery Commission, recognized an inconsistency between the F.C.C.'s actions and the protections of the first
amendment insofar as a construction of section 1304 which bans
bona fide news of a lottery is a prior restraint upon the programming judgment of broadcasters. The court then scrutinized and repudiated two possible justifications for this restraint. Labelling the winning number as "hot news,"' 71 the court rejected the argument that
such information is not deserving of first amendment protection, regardless of the size of the class of persons interested:
[The broadcast news media] at least as much as the other news
media should be left free to make their own editorial decisions as
to what news will best serve their public. The only restraints on
information by which, in the news context, the broadcast media may
67. Id. at 97. In fairness to the F.C.C., there seems to have been every intention
at this point to permanently adhere to the direct promotion test, as its dictates form a
major part of the Commission's argument before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 4.
68. 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S.Ct. 941 (1975).
69. See note 25 supra.
70. 491 F.2d at 222. This interpretation of section 326 is apparently consistent with
earlier Supreme Court opinions that dealt with the same section. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969), the
Court stated:
mhe FCC is free to implement [the requirement of equal time for discussion
of public issues] by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridgement of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed by
§ 326 of the Act.
See also Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S.
94, 116 (1973).
71. Once the court has labelled such lottery broadcasts as "hot news," the F.C.C.
can no longer retreat to either of the positions it held before the final New Jersey declaratory ruling. If the F.C.C. sees a dichotomy between what is news and what is a
direct promotion, this judicial opinion states clearly that such information is to be in
the former category; and if the test is to be whether something is ordinary broadcast
journalism, the broadcasting of information classed as "hot news" surely meets this criterion.
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constitutionally be bound are those imposed by what little is left

of the law of libel.

. .

and by the law of obscenity ....

72

Dealing next with the contention that the status of broadcasters as
federal licensees makes this prior restraint permissible, the court, realizing that program content can indeed sometimes be permissibly restrained, pointed out the only two areas where this has occurred.
One such area is the commercial promotion of products deemed by
Congress to be unworthy of promotion, e.g., cigarettes. 73 The other
is the area of equal access for the dissemination of competing
ideas. 74 The court, however, found both these situations inapposite
to lottery broadcasts, and decided that prior restraints imposed in the
past are not analogous to that proposed by the F.C.C. in the present
situation. The court reasoned:
If Congress may condition the grant of a license upon submission to prior restraint against broadcast of this news item, how
would one distinguish a condition imposing a prior restraint on the
broadcast of stock market
or commodity future prices, or indeed
75
of any subject matter?

The Third Circuit then concluded with an opinion which evinces a
desire to go as far as possible to protect the first amendment rights
of broadcasters. So as to avoid any inconsistency between agency
action and the first amendment which might be caused by prior restraint of news, the court suggested that the F.C.C. apply the statute
only to promotions for which the licensee receives compensation."6
This suggestion stands in sharp contrast to the decision of the Second
Circuit calling for a ban of all directly promotional material. Two
circuit courts of appeal, then, attempting to give meaning to the ambiguous words of the same statute, reached inconsistent conclusions.
The emphasis of the Second Circuit was on the ability of an expert
agency to discern just what is a promotion of more than indirect proportions, and that of the Third Circuit on the journalistic discretion of the news media as totally protected, in a news context, by the
first amendment.
72.

491 F.2d at 223.

73.

See Banzhaff v. Federal Communications Commission, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.

1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
74. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395
U.S. 367 (1967).
75.

491 F.2d at 223-24.

76.

With a nod toward its sister circuit, the court acknowledged the decision in the

New York State Broadcasters case that some so-called news may be so far outside the

realm of journalism that it might be classed as promotional rather than news.

How-

ever, the court carefully declined to take a stand on that issue here, since the proposed

announcement before them-the winning number-is unadulterated broadcast journalism. 491 F.2d at 224.
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The Third Circuit's reference to the F.C.C.'s action as a prior restraint seems to be justified when such action is contrasted with the
few exceptions which have been carved into the broadcast media's
freedom from prior restraint. In Banzhaft v. Federal Communications Commission,77 the court upheld a Commission ruling that stations which carry cigarette advertisements must devote broadcast time
to the case against smoking. In reaching this conclusion, the court
offered two reasons why it felt that the intrusion into program content was permissible. First, since no speech was actually banned by
the ruling, any prior restraint would have to be the result of a chilling
effect of some sort on the broadcasters. Such chiling effect in Banzhail could only have effected the broadcaster's choice of advertisements, which are commercial speech, traditionally less rigorously protected by the first amendment.7 1 Secondly, the Banzhajj court saw
the first amendment gain which would result from the F.C.C. mandate to grant access to those who wish to speak against smoking as
being greater than any supposed loss. In the context of lottery broadcasting, however, non-commercial speech faces an absolute ban, and
no enhancement of others' rights to air their views is evident. Therefore, the rationale of Banzhalf as a justification for prior restraint
seems inapplicable.
Another restraint upon total broadcast freedom is the equal access
doctrine upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission.7 ' The rationale of the Court's decision in Red
Lion was that the first amendment right of broadcasters to control the
programming of their stations is outweighed by the public's right to receive informed discussion on all issues of public importance. This
reasoning would seem to bolster, rather than weaken, the Third Circuit's opinion of the impermissible nature of the F.C.C.'s proposed
restraint on lottery information, since lottery information could be
viewed as a matter of public importance.
The F.C.C., however, took the position that there is no prior restraint on protected speech, relying upon the very cases, Banzha[f and
77. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
78. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) and Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
The battle against cigarette advertising reached its conclusion in Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), where
a statutory ban on all cigarette advertisements over the airwaves was upheld. As in

Banzhaff, the law withstood first amendment attacks because the court saw no substantial effect on broadcasters' first amendment rights, since what was lost was potential advertising revenue, and not the right to speak.
79. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Red Lion, which the Third Circuit used to support precisely the opposite view.8 0 The basic difference between the positions is that the
court cited these cases for the proposition that prior restraint of lottery information is not analogous to the prior restraints on broadcasting that these earlier cases had permitted. The Commission, however, observed that prior restraint of lottery information is not the
kind of prior restraint these cases specifically banned. The F.C.C.
supported its view by positing that the broadcast of the winning number, like the broadcast of cigarette advertisements in Banzhafl, "does
not provide information on matters of public importance. . . . [T]he
importance of such information is limited to lottery ticketholders and
only in direct connection with the lottery's operation.""'
Though the difference in the interpretations of Banzhaff and Red
Lion may rest simply upon a differing attitude toward the first amendment rights of broadcasters, the rectitude of one or the other viewpoint does not appear to be merely a matter of opinion. Indeed, the
reply to the F.C.C.'s position that lottery broadcasts provide no information of public importance, and are thus unprotected, came years
earlier in American BroadcastingCo., where the court noted:
The merits of the "give-away" programs are not an issue in this
case. They appear to be a source of amusement for many thousands of people. Even if it could be said that "we can see nothing
of any possible value to society" in these programs, "'they are as
much entitled 8to2 the protection of free speech as the best of literature" or music.
Closely analogous to the position of the F.C.C. that lottery information lacks the public importance requisite to first amendment protection is the argument that section 1304 evinces a congressional intent to
treat lottery information in the same manner as obscenity and
schemes to defraud. Since these latter two items are communications
not worthy of first amendment protection, it follows that lottery information cannot be worthy of such protection.8 3 The Commission
relied upon the decision of the Second Circuit in the New York
State Broadcasters case, where the court declared that "Congress has
the power to have a 'view' as to these types of conduct and to take
8' 4
steps to inhibit each.
80. See text accompanying notes 74 and 75 supra, and 491 F.2d at 223.
81. Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 16-17.
82. 110 F. Supp. at 389; accord, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948),
where the Court said, "What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."
83. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 49, at 11; and Brief for Respondent,
supra note 29, at 14-15.
84. 414 F.2d at 997.
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What both the F.C.C. and the Second Circuit failed to note in reaching this conclusion, however, is that in the case of each category of
communication which has been found to be outside the first amendment's protection (obscenity, fighting words, and the like), some
countervailing public interest was asserted to outweigh the amendment's sanctuary for speech."5 In light of the Commission's treatment
of horseracing broadcasts,8 6 it is unlikely that an effective argument can
be made that the first amendment interests of the media are overbalanced by a supposed public interest in suppressing the spread of
gambling through use of the airwaves. The absence of such a public
interest would seem to indicate that the total first amendment security
accorded to protected categories of broadcast information should apply
to lottery news as well.
A further point which the Commission and the Second Circuit seem
to miss is that any broadcast coverage of those things which they use
as examples of non-protected speech (the sale of fraudulent securities
or narcotics), 7 would be so far outside the ambit of broadcast journalism that they could not be described as news protected by 47
U.S.C. § 326. Moreover, the Third Circuit's opinion leads to this
conclusion in its comparison of the winning number to stock market
prices and its characterizaton of the number as "unadulterated broadcast journalism-news-and clearly . . . protected by 47 U.S.C.
§ 326 and the first amendment. 8 8
The F.C.C., therefore, has failed to make a defensible argument
that lottery broadcasts are equatable with previously unprotected
classes of speech. This failure gives additional support to the Third
Circuit's decision that censorship of uncompensated broadcasts of lottery information presents a classic case of prior restraint of news.
POST-THIRD CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS

State lottery proponents, interested observers of the way in which the
F.C.C. applied section 1304, were understandably relieved by the apparent deliverance of the state games from the Commission's bailiwick by the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 1307.89 It appears, however,
85. In the context of broadcast journalism, this balancing process was given explicit
sanction by the Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973), where the Court specified that government
power should only be asserted within the framework of the Communications Act when
the public interest is greater than the journalistic interest of broadcasters.
86. See text accompanying notes 36 through 50 supra.

87.
88.

414 F.2d at 997, and Brief for Respondent, supra note 29, at 14.
491 F.2d at 224.

89.

See note 8 supra.
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that the new statute may not totally foreclose future F.C.C. application of section 1304 to state lotteries as broadcasters would have
liked. Section 1307 negates the application of section 1304 to information concerning a state lottery if broadcast by a station licensed
in that state or an adjacent lottery state. The reason why Congress
permitted the broadcasting of information concerning a state's lottery
by a station located in an adjacent state was summarized in the
House debates preceding passage of 18 U.S.C. § 1307:
[T]here are some States, for instance, New Hampshire, that do not
have any particular delegated broadcasting stations, but they rely
particularly on the television stations in Boston, Mass., which is
an adjoining State, and most of the advertising, most of the big
television programs come we think from Boston, rather than New
Hampshire.90
The effect of this provision was explained in the same debates as follows:
Mr. Dennis: ....
In other words, if my State is a non-lottery State, but it is adjacent to a lottery State, is a television or radio station in my State
now entitled to broadcast . . . ?
Mr. Rodino: ,No; the advertising and information would be broadcast by stations in that State or in any adjacent State which
conducts those lotteries; so it has got to be a State that has already authorized lotteries and is adjacent.9 1
In light of this explanation, an obvious problem survives section
1307. If a broadcast outlet in a non-lottery state wishes to air
information about the lottery of an adjacent state whose lottery attracts
a large number of customers from the non-lottery state, section 1307
has no applicability. Therefore, the broadcaster finds himself in the
same position as the New York and New Jersey broadcasters in the two
principal cases, inquiring of the F.C.C. exactly what section 1304
does and does not proscribe. Since there has been no Supreme Court
settlement of the split between the two federal circuits,9 2 the question
remains whether the F.C.C. will apply the Second Circuit's "directly
90. 120 CONo. Rsc. H12606 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974) (remarks of Congressman
Smith).
91. Id.
92. The judgment of the appellate court in New Jersey State Lottery Commission
was vacated by the Supreme Court on February 25, 1975, and the case remanded to the
Third Circuit to consider whether or not the adoption of section 1307 has rendered the
case moot. The argument against mootness is the Damoclean nature of possible F.C.C.
application of section 1304 to broadcasters in non-lottery states adjacent to a lottery
state. Intervenor, the State of New Hampshire, makes this argument in relation to the
right of Vermont broadcasters to broadcast news of the New Hampshire lottery to their
listeners in both Vermont and New Hampshire. 95 S. Ct. 941 (1975).
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promotional" test, or will follow the more recent Third Circuit decision that only commercial speech is banned by section 1304.
The Commission gave an indication of its preference in reply
to the Maryland State Lottery Agency concerning proposed television
coverage of the drawing of the state's first winning number. 9 This
reply came fifteen days after the decision of the Third Circuit in New
Jersery State Lottery Commission and, although allowing coverage of
the original drawing, stated, inter alia, that "continued broadcasts of
this kind during subsequent weeks would raise questions of compliance with the statute under the guidelines set out in New York State
Broadcasters Association v. F.C.C." and the F.C.C. rulings in the
New York case. 4 Neither the Third Circuit nor the State of New
Jersey were mentioned in the Commission's letter to the Maryland
agency. This omission suggests that the F.C.C., though not the Supreme Court, has already chosen which construction of section 1304
will receive agency approval if any further application of the statute
is necessary.
CONCLUSION

It is not readily apparent why Congress did not choose to go further than it did in its formulation of section 1307 so as to avoid the
above problem-non-lottery states adjacent to lottery states-by
throwing the airwaves open to any broadcaster who determines, in
an exercise of journalistic discretion protected by the first amendment,
that information concerning another state's lottery is sufficiently
newsworthy to warrant coverage on his station. For whatever reason, such a decision was not made and, therefore, section 1307 does
nothing to alter the underlying constitutional problem which surfaced
in the lottery cases. 95
The judiciary has attempted repeatedly to set the parameters of the
first amendment's limitations in a broadcast context, yet even now
the obscurity of these boundaries is illustrated by the diverse interpretations of previous broadcast cases in relation to the proscription of
lottery broadcasts. 96 Either cases like Banzhaff and Red Lion repre93. 44 F.C.C.2d 978 (1974).
94.

95.

Id.

Justice Douglas, the sole dissenter from the decision of the Supreme Court to

vacate and remand the New Jersey State Lottery Commission case for a consideration

of mootness, concurs in this conclusion on the persistence of the constitutional problem.
95 S. Ct. 941, 943 (1975).
96. See text accompanying notes 81 through 82 supra.
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sent the proposition that whatever does not in some way contribute to
satiation of the public's demand for information is subject to prior
governmental restraint (the F.C.C.'s position), or these cases illustrate
the view that anything which is not analogous in quality to what has
been deemed unworthy of first amendment protection, such as cigarette advertisements, cannot be constitutionally inhibited (the Third
Circuit's position).
The narrow issue at stake in New Jersey State Lottery Commissionbroadcast of the winning number by an in-state television stationsusceptible as it was to preemption by section 1307, did not provide the Supreme Court an adequate forum for clarifying the constitutional controversy. 7 Perhaps the Court will discover an opportunity
in the near future to explain further how much of the gamut of first
amendment freedoms is withheld from the broadcast media. Indeed,
with the proliferation of state lotteries, and the probable desire of
broadcasters in non-lottery states to inform their viewers of the information which may make a small few of them moderately wealthy, it
would be of little surprise if this opportunity was thrust upon the
Court in the same context which has so vexed two judicial circuits:
F.C.C. utilization of section 1304.
PETER PETRAKIS

97.

See note 92 supra.
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